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Abstract 
In this paper we argue that two important causes of welfare losses in oligopolistic markets have 
been neglected. We show that in models where location is endogenous, welfare losses arising 
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1. Introduction
An important issue in Industrial Organization is the study of the ine¢ ciencies yielded
by imperfect competition. In a pathbreaking contribution, Harberger (1954) provided
a quantitative estimate of these ine¢ ciencies by computing the "Harberger triangle"
for a number of US manufacturing industries. Later studies disputed the ndings of
Harberger. In particular, several authors pointed out other sources of welfare losses, such
as lack of cost minimization (Leibenstein 1966) or the expenses of acquiring/maintaining
market power (Tullock 1967).1
In this paper we aim to contribute to this line of thinking. We will argue that several
crucial determinants of welfare losses have been neglected and others may have been
overstated. To substantiate our point, we study welfare losses in models of horizontal
di¤erentiation (Hotelling 1929, dAspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse 1979, Economides
1984 and Salop 1979) and vertical di¤erentiation (Gabszewicz and Thisse 1979, 1980,
and Shaked and Sutton 1982, 1983). In these models, location and market coverage
(variables that are absent in the literature) play a paramount role in the determination
of welfare losses. And Lerners degree of monopoly (and thus, Harberger triangle) does
not play any role determining welfare losses. Let us see why.
Section 2 considers the Hotelling model. Like Harberger (1954), we consider the
percentage of welfare losses (PWL) dened as the percentage at which equilibrium
welfare falls short of the optimum. We rst study how PWL depends on the basic
parameters that dene the market such as the reservation price, transportation cost and
marginal costs. We nd that PWL depends on these magnitudes in a non-monotonic
way. The reason is that a change in these magnitudes not only changes welfare for given
locations but also causes rms to reallocate. Next, we study if PWL can be recovered
from observable variables such as prices, marginal costs, location and the percentage of
market coverage. We nd that, in most cases, PWL can be calculated from location and
market coverage alone. PWL decreases with market coverage (unless in the optimum
the whole market should not be covered, in which case PWL is constant) and with the
distance from the market edges as it goes to the optimal location. Prices, marginal costs
1See Cowling and Mueller (1978, p. 728) for a summary of the criticism of Harbergers approach.
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(and thus markups) and demand elasticities do not help to nd PWL:2 Finally, PWL
might be large despite price competition. This shows that misallocation arising from
the wrong location and lack of market cover could be very signicant.3
Section 3 considers a model of a circular city (Salop 1979). Here PWL depends
on the magnitudes mentioned in the Hotelling case and also on the number of rms
and the form of the transportation cost, which in Hotelling was quadratic and here is
either linear or quadratic. As in the Hotelling model, PWL decreases with the market
coverage, unless in the optimum the whole market should not be covered, in which
case PWL is constant. Here, PWL can be calculated in all cases. In other words,
the indeterminacy that occurred in the Hotelling model does not arise here. As in the
Hotelling model and for the same reason, PWL is independent of demand elasticities
and markups. Also, since here there are no misallocations due to rms being in the
wrong locations, PWL tends to be smaller than in the Hotelling model. But these
losses may be large, up to 25%. Finally, PWL is not monotonic in the transportation
cost for given market coverage. The reason is that a change in this magnitude changes
welfare both in equilibrium and in the optimal allocations.
In Section 4 we study vertical (quality) di¤erentiation (Gabszewicz and Thisse 1979,
1980 and Shaked and Sutton 1982, 1983). We assume that the parameter that mea-
sures the taste for quality is uniformly distributed across the population of consumers,
assumed to be in a closed interval. Here we have two kinds of equilibria: those in which
the whole market is covered and those in which not all the market is covered.4 We nd
that PWL is a discontinuous function of the length of the interval mentioned above
with a maximum of about 8:33%. The discontinuity is caused by the fact that there is
a point in which a low-quality rm freezes the quality of its good and does not serve
consumers with very low taste for quality. This discontinuity arises at the point at
2For the role of markups and demand elasticities in models with exogenous location and quality
choice see Corchón and Zudenkova (2009) .
3 It can be argued that lack of market coverage cannot occur once entry is allowed in the model.
The di¢ culty is that the Hotelling model becomes intractable with more than two rms so that, at this
stage, it is di¢ cult to gauge the importance of this criticism.
4We remark that, given a vector of parameters dening a market, equilibrium is unique. Thus, we
cannot have the two classes of equilibria mentioned above simultaneously in the same market.
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which the market becomes uncovered. Welfare losses can be computed from relative
prices and the degree of market coverage.5 When the whole market is covered, PWL
is single-peaked in relative prices reaching a maximum at an interior point. Thus an
increase in relative prices can decrease or increase relative welfare losses. When not all
the market is covered, PWL depends only on market coverage, in a decreasing way, as
expected.
Finally, Section 5 sums up our ndings.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one paper dealing with the issues tackled
in this paper, namely Fan (2010). She studies mergers in the U.S. Daily Newspaper
Market considering xed location. She nds that ignoring adjustments in quality causes
substantial di¤erences in estimated e¤ects of mergers. Apart from our common emphasis
on variables other than prices and quantities, our studies are di¤erent. She focuses on
welfare e¤ects of mergers and we focus on the di¤erence between optimal and equilibrium
welfare. She focuses on quality and considers location xed. Moreover, she does not
consider the welfare impact of market coverage.
Summing up, our paper provides a theoretical study of welfare losses produced by
oligopoly when location or quality is endogenous. Our study suggests that variables
that have been overlooked in most empirical studies and the regulation literature might
play a very important role. A shortcoming of our study is that it relies on assumptions
that are unlikely to be met in actual markets like duopoly and symmetry. But if these
assumptions are removed, computations are extremely complex and the models become
unworkable. Thus, our paper is better understood as a pointer on the role of certain
variables rather than a ready-to-use guide on the role of these variables in actual markets.
2. Horizontal Di¤erentiation: The Hotelling Model
There are two rms producing a di¤erentiated good. Consumers purchase either one unit
or none of the di¤erentiated good according to preferences, prices and the distribution of
the two brands in product space. Brands are located in the interval [0; 1]. Each consumer
has a most-preferred brand specication  . Consumers are uniformly distributed along
5As in the Hotelling model, we do not consider entry in the vertical di¤erentiation model.
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[0; 1] with density 1. A brand located at point xi, i = 1; 2, is valued for the consumer
at point  according to U (xi; ) =    d where  stands for the reservation price,
d = jxi    j is the Euclidean distance between xi and  ,  and  measure the importance
of transportation costs, and  and  are positive. The decision rule of consumer  is:
purchase one unit of brand xi if maxi [U (xi; )  pi]  0, where pi is the price of brand
xi, i = 1; 2. The marginal cost of production is c < .
The model where  = 1 is not easily tractable since prot functions are discontinuous
and nonconcave.6 To overcome these di¢ culties we assume that  = 2. Summing up:
Denition 1. A Linear Horizontal Market is a list of positive real numbers f; ; cg
with  > c.7
Let us consider a two-stage game. In the rst stage, rms choose their locations x1
and x2 simultaneously. In the second stage, they choose prices simultaneously. Without
loss of generality, assume that x2  x1. Firm is prot is i = (pi   c)Di where Di is
the demand of rm i. It is easy to show that prot functions are continuous and concave
and a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium exists.8
We consider three symmetric equilibrium congurations: local monopolistic equi-
librium, kinked equilibrium and competitive equilibrium.9 We characterize equilibria
where consumers at the edges of the market buy the di¤erentiated good.10
6For further details see dAspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Economides (1984).
7"Linear" relates to the linear form of the product space. "Horizontal" refers to the form of product
di¤erentiation. In Section 4 we will speak of a "Linear Vertical" market in which product di¤erentiation
is vertical.
8See Economides (1986) for the general case of   2. Economides (1986) showed existence of a
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium for  2 (1:26; 2].
9Salop (1979) used the term "kinked" for an equilibrium where the markets just touch and there is
no tangency of demand. Economides (1984) used the term "touching" for such an equilibrium.
10Economides (1984) studied the case of a "not-too-high" reservation price where consumers at the
edges of the market prefer not to purchase the di¤erentiated good. He showed that under linear trans-
portation cost function the equilibrium of the locations game is a local monopolistic one. The reason
is that in the "competitive region" rms have incentives to relocate marginally away from each other
and reach the "kinked" region. While in the "kinked" region rms still want to relocate away from each
other and reach the "local monopolistic" region.
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Local monopolistic equilibrium. At this equilibrium, some consumers lying between
two rms do not purchase the di¤erentiated good, so the market is not fully covered.
Each rm charges monopoly price pm. A consumer with preferred brand  2
 
x1;
1
2

is
indi¤erent between purchasing from rm 1 and not purchasing the di¤erentiated good
if    (   x1)2   pm = 0. Thus, rm 1s demand is D1 (pm) =  = x1 +
q
 pm
 . In
the second stage rm 1s prot maximization with respect to pm yields
pm (x1) =
1
9

6+ 3c  2x21 + 2
q
x21
 
3 (  c) + x21

.
Plugging pm (x1) into rm 1s prot yields
1 (x1) = (pm (x1)  c)
 
x1 +
s
  pm (x1)

!
.
After tedious calculations one nds that @1@x1 > 0, so rms have incentives to relocate
towards the market center still maintaining local monopoly power. Firms will move
to the market center until consumers at the edges of the market are just indi¤erent
between buying the di¤erentiated good and not. One can check that in this case the
rmsmarginal relocation tendency becomes zero.
Consumers at the edges of the market are indi¤erent between buying the good and
not buying it, which amounts to x1  
q
 pm(x1)
 = 0. Consumers at the market center
do not buy the di¤erentiated good, which amounts to x1 +
q
 pm(x1)
 <
1
2 . These two
conditions yield a local monopolistic equilibrium: rm 1 chooses x1 =
q
 c
5 , and by
symmetry rm 2 chooses x2 = 1 
q
 c
5 . Both rms charge the same price p

m =
4+c
5 .
This equilibrium exists for  c <
5
16 .
Denition 2. A Local Monopolistic Equilibrium for a linear horizontal market f; ; cg
with  c <
5
16 is a price p

m =
4+c
5 and brand locations fxm1; xm2g =
nq
 c
5 ; 1 
q
 c
5
o
.
Kinked equilibrium. At a kinked equilibrium, markets just "touch". A consumer with
preferred brand specication  = 12 is indi¤erent between purchasing from rm 1 or from
rm 2 at price pk and not purchasing the di¤erentiated good if  
 
1
2   x1
2 pk = 0.
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Thus, pk (x1) =   
 
1
2   x1
2
. At the same time, rms still enjoy local monopolistic
power, therefore pk (x1) = pm (x1), which yields
x1 = 1 
1
2
r
4
  c

+ 1 and pk =
1
2

2c   +
p
 (4 (  c) + )

.
In the kinked equilibrium rms behave as local monopolists but maintain full market
coverage so x1 > 0 or
 c
 <
3
4 . The consumers at the edges of the market purchase the
di¤erentiated good so    (x1)2   pk  0, which simplies to  c  516 .
Note that for 34   c < 54 there is a kinked equilibrium with fx1; x2g = f0; 1g and
pk =    4 , which is an intermediate case between the kinked equilibrium described
above and the competitive equilibrium, which is analyzed below.
Denition 3. A Kinked Equilibrium for a linear horizontal market f; ; cg with 516 
 c
 <
3
4 is a price p

k =
1
2

2c   +p (4 (  c) + ) and brand locations fxk1; xk2g =n
1  12
q
4 c + 1;
1
2
q
4 c + 1
o
.
A Kinked Equilibrium for a linear horizontal market f; ; cg with 34   c < 54 is
a price pk =   4 and brand locations fxk1; xk2g = f0; 1g.
Competitive equilibrium. A consumer with preferred brand specication  2 (x1; x2),
is indi¤erent between purchasing brand x1 and purchasing brand x2 if
   (   x1)2   p1 =    (x2   )2   p2 )  = p2   p1
2 (x2   x1) +
x1 + x2
2
;
so the demands D1 (p1; p2) and D2 (p1; p2) faced by rms 1 and 2 read
D1 (p1; p2)   = p2   p1
2 (x2   x1) +
x1 + x2
2
D2 (p1; p2)  1   = 1  p2   p1
2 (x2   x1)  
x1 + x2
2
Firm is prot maximization with respect to pi yields
p1 = c+

3
(x2   x1) (2 + x1 + x2) and p2 = c+ 
3
(x2   x1) (4  x1   x2) ;
and corresponding prots become
1 =

18
(x2   x1) (2 + x1 + x2)2 and 2 = 
18
(x2   x1) (4  x1   x2)2 :
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The "marginal relocation tendency of rms" reads @1@x1 < 0 and
@2
@x2
> 0. Thus, the rms
have incentives to relocate marginally away from each other. The equilibrium has two
rms locating at the two extremes of the product space (maximal di¤erentiation) x1 = 0
and x2 = 1 and charging the same price pc = c+ . At the competitive equilibrium the
entire market is covered, so     122   pc  0, which amounts to  c  54 .
Denition 4. A Competitive Equilibrium for a linear horizontal market f; ; cg with
 c
  54 is a price pc = c+  and a list of brand locations fxc1; xc2g = f0; 1g.
Thus, the equilibrium conguration depends on the values taken by  c .
- For low values of  c (i.e.
 c
 <
5
16), there exists a local monopolistic symmetric
equilibrium where the rms enjoy monopolistic power at the market edges while con-
sumers in the center of the market do not purchase the di¤erentiated commodity. The
higher the value of  c , the closer rm 1 (resp. rm 2) to location
1
4 (resp.
3
4).
- If  c =
5
16 there exists a kinked equilibrium where the whole market is covered
and fxk1; xk2g =

1
4 ;
3
4
	
. In this equilibrium rms enjoy all the monopolistic power:
they sell to consumers both at the market edges and in the market center, and still do
not become involved in competition with one another.
- If 516 <
 c
 <
3
4 there is a kinked equilibrium where the whole market is covered,
rms do not compete for the market center consumers (the markets just touch) but do
not extract all the possible surplus from the market edges consumers: the consumers at
the edges of the market get positive surplus by purchasing the di¤erentiated commodity.
- If 34   c < 54 there exists a kinked equilibrium where the whole market is covered,
rms are situated at the edges of the market fxk1; xk2g = f0; 1g and do not compete
for the market center consumer (the markets just touch).
- Finally, for high values of  c (i.e.
 c
  54) there is a competitive equilibrium
where the entire market is covered, the rms are situated at the edges of the market
fxc1; xc2g = f0; 1g and compete for the market center consumers.
Dene social welfare W as the gross consumerssurplus minus costs (i.e., the mar-
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ginal cost and the consumerstransportation costs):
W = 2
Z
0

  c   (t  x1)2

dt
which is equal in equilibrium to
W  =
8>>><>>>:
56
15
p
5
(  c)
q
 c
 if
 c
 <
5
16
3
4
q
4 c + 1  56 if 516   c < 34
  c  12 if  c  34
Note that the social welfare does not depend on the equilibrium price, which is just a
transfer from the consumers to the producers. In our framework the social welfare is only
a¤ected by the market coverage and rmslocations, which determine the consumers
transportation costs and the consumerssurplus net of marginal cost. This is the reason
why the social welfare in a kinked equilibrium for 34   c < 54 is the same as the
social welfare in a competitive equilibrium for  c  54 . Indeed, in both cases the whole
market is covered and the rms are located at the market edges.
A social planner would choose the price equal to marginal cost and the rms lo-
cations to maximize the social welfare. One can check that the social welfare in the
optimum, denoted by W o, is equal to
W o =
8<: 83 (  c)
q
 c
 if
 c
 <
1
16
  c  48 if  c  116
where the rst line corresponds to the case where not all the market is covered and
consumers at the market center do not purchase the di¤erentiated commodity; the
second line corresponds to the case where the entire market is covered and the rms are
located at fxo1; xo2g =

1
4 ;
3
4
	
.
The percentage of welfare losses is dened as
PWL  1  W

W o
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Figure 2.1: PWL as a function of  c .
and is equal to
PWL =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
1  7
5
p
5
 0:3739 if  c < 116
1 
56
15
p
5
q
 c

1  1
48

 c
if 116   c < 516
1 
3
4
q
4 c

+1  5
6
 c

  1
48
if 516   c < 34
1 
 c

  1
12
 c

  1
48
if  c  34
(2.1)
Figure 2.1 depicts PWL as a function of  c . Note that PWL is not monotonic in
 c
 . The reason is that a change in
 c
 not only changes welfare for given locations
but it causes reallocation e¤ects that may overcome the latter e¤ect. For instance, a
decrease in transportation costs  makes the economy more competitive, but at the
same time causes rms to relocate away from each other, increasing monopoly power.
- For  c <
1
16 PWL is constant. In this case the market is not covered either
in equilibrium or in the optimum. Welfare losses are due to the rmsmonopolistic
behavior.
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- For 116   c < 516 , PWL is decreasing in  c . In this case in equilibrium the
market is not covered, while in the optimum it should be covered. Indeed, with an
increase of  c the equilibrium conguration gets closer to the optimum conguration
fxo1; xo2g =

1
4 ;
3
4
	
.
- For  c =
5
16 PWL = 0 since equilibrium conguration is the same as the optimum
one: the whole market is covered and the rms are located at

1
4 ;
3
4
	
.
- When 516 <
 c
 <
3
4 PWL is increasing in
 c
 . In this case the higher
 c
 is,
the closer the rms locate to the edges of the market (so the higher the consumers
transportation costs are). This e¤ect exacerbates welfare losses.
- Finally, when  c  34 PWL is decreasing in  c . Here in equilibrium, the rms
locate at the market edges and compete for the consumers located at the market center.
Thus, PWL is decreasing in  c .
So far we have analyzed the relationship between PWL and the parameters dening
a linear horizontal market f; ; cg. Let us now relate PWL with observable variables.
An Observation is a tuple fp; c; x;mg of market price p, marginal cost c (p > c), the
relative distance from the market edges to brand locations x 2 0; 14 and the percentage
of market coverage m 2 [0; 1]. We assume that the marginal cost is observable because
under constant returns, the marginal cost equals the average variable cost, which in
principle can be observed (wages, raw materials, etc.). Then, we have the following:
Proposition 1. Given an observation fp; c; x;mg there is a linear horizontal market
f; ; cg such that fp; x; 1  xg is
i) a local monopolistic equilibrium for this market when m < 1 and 0  x < 14 ;
ii) a kinked equilibrium for this market when m = 1 and 0 < x  14 ;
iii) either a kinked equilibrium or a competitive equilibrium for this market when
m = 1 and x = 0;
PWL in each case is given by
PWL =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1  7
5
p
5
 0:3739 if m < 1, 0  x < 1
4
p
5
1  896x3
240x2 1 if m < 1,
1
4
p
5
 x < 14
1  32 72x35 48x(2 x) if m = 1, 0 < x  14
2  0; 335 , 335  0:0857 if m = 1, x = 0
(2.2)
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Proof : First, consider the case where not all the market is covered, i.e. m < 1
and x < 14 . Let  =
5p c
4 and  =
p c
4x2
. We easily see that the linear horizontal
market f; ; cg yields a local monopolistic equilibrium where pm = p and fxm1; xm2g =
fx; 1  xg. When x < 1
4
p
5
in the optimum not all the market is covered and PWL =
1  7
5
p
5
. When x  1
4
p
5
in the optimum the entire market should be covered. Plugging
 = 5p c4 and  =
p c
4x2
into the second line of (2.1) yields the second line of (2.2) for
PWL as a function of observables.
Next, consider the case where the entire market is covered, i.e. m = 1, and the rms
do not locate at the edges of the market, i.e. 0 < x  14 . Let  = 12 (3p  c  2x (p  c))
and  = 2(p c)1 2x . It is straightforward to check that the linear horizontal market f; ; cg
yields a kinked equilibrium where pk = p and fxk1; xk2g = fx; 1  xg. Plugging  =
1
2 (3p  c  2x (p  c)) and  = 2(p c)1 2x into the third line of (2.1) yields the third line of
(2.2) for PWL as a function of observables.
Finally, let us consider the case where the entire market is covered, i.e. m = 1, and
the rms locate at the edges of the market, i.e. x = 0. Here, with available observables
there is no way to distinguish between the kinked equilibrium where the rms are located
at the market edges and the competitive equilibrium.
In the case of the kinked equilibrium where the rms are located at the market edges,
let us x 5p c4 <   3p c2 (for condition 34   c < 54 to hold) and let  = 4 (  p).
It is straightforward to check that the linear horizontal market f; ; cg yields a kinked
equilibrium where pk = p and fxk1; xk2g = f0; 1g. From the fourth line of (2.1) we get
PWL in the kinked equilibrium, denoted as PWLk, as a function of observables and :
PWLk =
3 (  p)
11+ p  12c where
5p  c
4
<   3p  c
2
which is increasing in  and achieves its maximal value of 335 at  =
3p c
2 and its minimal
value of 359 at  =
5p c
4 . This and the continuity of PWLk with respect to  imply that
PWLk 2
 
3
59 ;
3
35

.
In the case of the competitive equilibrium, let us x   5p c4 (for condition  c  54
to hold) and let  = p  c. It is easy to show that the linear horizontal market f; ; cg
yields a competitive equilibrium where pc = p and fxc1; xc2g = f0; 1g. From the fourth
line of (2.1) we get PWL in the competitive equilibrium, denoted as PWLc, as a function
12
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Figure 2.2: PWL as a function of observable relative distance x from the market edges
to brand locations when the market is not covered, m < 1 (dash), and when the market
is covered, m = 1 (solid).
of observables and :
PWLc =
3 (p  c)
48  47c  p where  
5p  c
4
which is decreasing in  and achieves its maximal value of 359 at  =
5p c
4 and goes
to 0 as  goes to innity. This and the continuity of PWLc with respect to  imply
that PWLc 2
 
0; 359

. Thus, in the case where the entire market is covered and the
rms locate at the edges of the market, i.e. m = 1 and x = 0, PWL 2  0; 335 with
3
35  0:0857.
Figure 2.2 depicts PWL as a function of observables. In general, as expected, PWL
decreases with market coverage (unless in the optimum the whole market should not
be covered, in which case PWL is constant) and with the distance x from the market
edges as it goes to the optimal location 14 . Other points are worth discussion.
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Firstly, PWL can be calculated from location and market coverage in three out
of four cases in (2.2). Only in the case where the whole market is covered and the
rms locate at the market edges, i.e. m = 1 and x = 0, could PWL be any number
between zero and 335 , even if price and marginal cost are observed.
11 Knowledge of
demand elasticity, denoted by ", cannot be used to break the indeterminacy of PWL.
In the case of a kinked equilibrium, the demand function is not di¤erentiable so demand
elasticity is not well dened. In the case of a competitive equilibrium, from the rst order
condition of prot maximization " = pp c , so knowledge of " is redundant. The same
argument applies if the cross elasticity of demand @Di@pj
pj
Di
, denoted by , is observable
since in our model, in equilibrium,  = ".12
Secondly, PWL is independent of demand elasticities (own and cross) and markups.
This is explained by the fact that as demand is totally inelastic, a high price, unless it
induces not buying the good, does not cause welfare losses. As we remarked before, an
increase in price just redistributes the surplus between consumers and rms. This makes
a di¤erence with models in which consumers may buy several goods where demand
elasticities and markups can be used to nd PWL even though their impact is sometimes
counterintuitive. See Corchón and Zudenkova (2009).
Thirdly, PWL might be large, larger than in the Cournot model with linear demand
and cost functions, which in the duopoly case is around 11% (Anderson and Renault
2003). And this occurs despite price competition in the Hotelling model. This shows
that misallocation arising from the wrong location could be very signicant, especially
when not all the market is covered. See Figure 2.2.
11PWL could be calculated if the reservation price is observed. The latter is usually thought to be
private information but, in some cases, it can be elicited by the mechanism of Becker, DeGroot and
Marschak (1964). For the limitations of this mechanism see Horowitz (2006) and the references there.
12However, if it could be determined whether the demand function is di¤erentiable, we would know if
the market is in a kinked equilibriumwhere PWL lies between 3
59
and 3
35
or in a competitive equilibrium
where PWL lies between 0 and 3
59
.
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3. Horizontal Di¤erentiation: The Salop Model
Consider the economy described in the previous section with the following changes.
Firstly, the product space of the monopolistically competitive industry is a circle with
a perimeter equal to 1. Secondly, there are n brands of the di¤erentiated good available
at prices p1; :::; pn. As before, each rm is allowed to produce just one brand. Thirdly,
rms do not choose their brand location, but are automatically located equidistant from
one another on the circle.13 This simplication allows this model to be solved for linear
( = 1) and quadratic ( = 2) transportation costs. Summing up:
Denition 5. A Circular Market is a list f; ; c; n; g, where ; ; c 2 R+,  2 f1; 2g;
n 2 N, and  > c.
Firm is prot is i = (pi   c)Di where Di is the demand rm i faces and pi is the
price chosen by rm i. As before, we consider three symmetric equilibrium congura-
tions: local monopolistic equilibrium, kinked equilibrium and competitive equilibrium.
Local monopolistic equilibrium. At the local monopolistic equilibrium, some con-
sumers lying between two neighboring rms do not purchase the di¤erentiated com-
modity, so the market is not covered. Each rm charges monopoly price pm. A con-
sumer with preferred brand specication located at the distance  2  0; 12n from rm
is brand specication, is indi¤erent between purchasing from rm i and not purchasing
the di¤erentiated commodity if      pm = 0. Thus, rm is demand is
Di (pm) = 2 = 2

  pm

 1

.
Firm is prot maximization yields pm =
c+
1+ . In local monopolistic equilibrium not
all the market is covered, which amounts to ( c)n

 <
1+
2 .
Denition 6. A Local Monopolistic Equilibrium for a circular market f; ; c; n; g
with ( c)n

 <
1+
2 is a price p

m =
c+
1+ and a quantity Di (p

m) = 2

 c
(1+)
 1

,
i = 1; 2; :::; n.
13See Economides (1989) where this assumption emerges in equilibrium in a model where rms decide
on locations.
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Kinked equilibrium. At a kinked equilibrium, markets just "touch". A consumer
with preferred brand specication located at the distance  = 12n from a rms brand
specication, is indi¤erent between purchasing from a rm or from its closest neighbor
at price pk and not purchasing the di¤erentiated commodity if    
 
1
2n
   pk = 0.
Thus, pk =  
 
1
2n

. In kinked equilibrium the entire market is covered, Di = 1n , but
there is no tangency of demand. These conditions amount to 1+2  ( c)n

  12 + 1.
Denition 7. A Kinked Equilibrium for a circular market f; ; c; n; g with 1+2 
( c)n
  12 + 1 is a price pk =   
 
1
2n

and a quantity Di (pk) =
1
n , i = 1; 2; :::; n.
Competitive equilibrium. Firms are located equidistant from one another and com-
pete in prices given these locations. Since they are located symmetrically, they will
charge the same price pc in the equilibrium. Firm i has two potential competitors,
namely rms i   1 and i + 1. Suppose that it chooses price pi  p. A consumer with
preferred brand specication located at the distance  2  0; 1n from rm is brand
specication, is indi¤erent between purchasing from rm i and from is closest neighbor
if      p =      1n      pc. Thus, is demand reads
Di (p; pc) = 2 =
1
n
+
pc   p

n 1:
Firm is prot maximization yields (in equilibrium p = pc) pc = c+

n . In competitive
equilibrium all consumers receive positive net surplus so the entire market is covered,
which amounts to ( c)n

 >
1
2 + 1.
Denition 8. A Competitive Equilibrium for a circular market f; ; c; n; g with
( c)n
 >
1
2 + 1 is a price p

c = c+

n and a quantity Di (p

c ; p

c) =
1
n , i = 1; 2; :::; n.
As before, the equilibrium conguration depends on the underlying parameters.
When  c and n are small, the market is small (either because the reservation price
and/or the number of rms are small or because marginal costs and/or transportation
costs  are large) and local monopolies arise.14 For intermediate values of ( c)n


14Notice that  appears on both sides of the inequalities dening di¤erent equilibria and its e¤ect on
them is not straightforward.
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markets touch and a kinked equilibrium arises. Finally, when ( c)n

 is large enough
the economy becomes competitive.
Social welfare, W , dened as before is
W = 2n
Z 
0
(  c  t) dt;
which in the equilibrium reads for  = 1; 2
W  =
8><>:
2(2+)
(1+)
2+ 1
( c)1+
1
 n

1

if ( c)n

 <
1+
2
  c  2(1+)n if ( c)n

  1+2
Notice that, again, the social welfare does not depend on the equilibrium price, which is
just a transfer from the consumers to the producers. In our framework the social welfare
is only a¤ected by the market coverage, which determines the consumerstransportation
costs and the consumerssurplus net of marginal cost.
A social planner would choose the price equal to marginal cost, which a¤ects the
market coverage and, therefore, the consumerstransportation costs and the consumers
surplus net of marginal cost. It is straightforward to show that the social welfare in the
optimum, denoted by W o, reads
W o =
8><>:
2
1+
( c)1+
1
 n

1

if ( c)n

 <
1
2
  c  2(1+)n if ( c)n

  12
where the rst (resp. second) line corresponds to the case where not all the market
(resp. the whole market) is covered in the optimum and  = 1; 2. The percentage of
welfare losses, dened as before, equals
PWL =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1  2+
(1+)
1+ 1
if ( c)n

 <
1
2
1 
2(2+)
(1+)
2+ 1

( c)n

 1

1  1
2 (1+)

( c)n
if 12  ( c)n

 <
1+
2
0 if ( c)n

  1+2
(3.1)
where  = 1; 2. Notice that the rst two lines (3.1) refer to local monopolistic equilib-
17
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
PWL
Figure 3.1: PWL as a function of ( c)n

 for linear  = 1 (solid) and quadratic  = 2
(dash) transportation costs.
rium. The rst (resp. second) line refers to the case in which the market should not
(resp. should) be covered in the optimum. The last line refers to kinked and competi-
tive equilibria. Since in the Salop model rms are located optimally and the price just
transfers money from consumers to producers, positive welfare losses are only possible
when the market is not covered. Figure 3.1 depicts PWL as a function of ( c)n

 for
linear  = 1 (solid) and quadratic  = 2 (dash) transportation costs.
We now study the relationship between the observable variables and PWL. As
before, we assume that market price, outputs, marginal costs, number of active rms
and  can be observed (in the Hotelling model we assumed that  = 2). Our view is
that  reects, basically, the technology of transportation and that this technology is
common knowledge.
Formally, let fp; x; c; n;g be an Observation, where p (> c) stands for market price,
x is quantity sold by each rm, which is dened as a proportion of consumers purchasing
from each rm, c is marginal cost, n 2 N is the number of active rms and  2f1; 2g is
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the transportation costs. Then, we have the following result.
Proposition 2. Given an observation fp; x; c; n;g there is a Circular Market f; ; c; n;g
such that fp; xg is a Local Monopolistic Equilibrium for this market when not all the
market is covered, i.e. when xn < 1, and PWL is given by
PWL =
8>>><>>>:
1  2+
(1+)
1+ 1
if xn < 1
(1+)
1

1  (2+)xn
(1+)2  1
(xn)
if 1
(1+)
1

 xn < 1
0 if xn = 1
(3.2)
Proof : When x < 1n (that is, not all the market is covered), let  =
(1+)p c

and  = 2


p c
x . We easily see that the circular market f; ; c; n;g yields a local
monopolistic equilibrium where pm = p and Di (pm) = x. When xn  1
(1+)
1

in the
optimum the whole market should be covered. Plugging  = (1+)p c and  =
2

p c
x
in (3.1) yields the formula (3.2) for PWL as a function of observable market coverage
xn and transportation costs .
Figure 3.2 depicts PWL as a function of observables xn for linear (solid) and
quadratic (dash) transportation costs. As in the Hotelling model, PWL decreases with
market coverage, unless in the optimum the whole market should not be covered; in
this case PWL is constant (25% under linear transportation costs, as in the standard
monopoly model with linear demand). When the whole market is covered both in equi-
librium and in the optimum, there are no welfare losses since, as we mentioned above,
social welfare does depend on the market coverage and not on prices. Other points are
worth discussion.
Firstly, PWL can be calculated in all cases. The indeterminacy that occurred in
the Hotelling model does not arise here.
Secondly, as in the Hotelling model and for the same reason, PWL is independent
of demand elasticities and markups.
Thirdly, since here there are no misallocations due to wrong locations, PWL is
smaller than in the Hotelling model. But these losses may be large.
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Figure 3.2: PWL as a function of market coverage xn for linear (solid) and quadratic
(dash) transportation costs.
Finally, Figure 3.2 shows that PWL is not monotonic in  for given market coverage.
The reason is that a change in  changes welfare both in equilibrium and in the optimal
allocations.
Entry can be considered in this framework by assuming that each rm incurs a xed
cost of entry, K.15 In this case PWL is a (non-monotonic) function of  cp
K
. PWL can
be very large, up to 50%. Given an observation, there is a Circular Market with free
entry such that the observation is an equilibrium for this market, and PWL 2  0; 12.
Thus, the introduction of xed costs makes it impossible to infer welfare losses from
observations. As before, knowledge of the demand elasticity or the cross elasticity of
demand adds nothing. All these results agree with those obtained in Corchón (2008)
for the case of Cournot equilibrium with free entry and product homogeneity.
15The results reported in this paragraph are available upon request.
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4. Vertical Di¤erentiation
In this section we study oligopolistic competition under quality di¤erentiation. This
model was developed by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980) and Shaked and Sutton
(1982, 1983). We consider the simplied version of Shaked and Sutton (1982). Again
we have a two-stage game in which in the rst stage rms compete in quality (one per
rm) and in the second stage they compete in prices.
Consumerspreferences are described by U = ts  p if the consumer purchases one
unit of quality s at price p, and by 0 otherwise. The parameter t of taste for quality is
uniformly distributed across the population of consumers, t  U [a; b] with 0 < a < b.
The density is 1b a .
Assume that there are two rms in the market. Firm i = 1; 2 produces a good of
quality si, where without loss of generality s2 > s1. Suppose further that si must belong
to (0; S]. We assume zero costs. In particular, the choice of quality is costless.
Denition 9. A Linear Vertical Market is a list fa; b; Sg with b > a > 0 and S > 0.
Consider price competition. Consumers with high taste for quality buy the high-
quality good and consumers with lower taste for quality buy the low-quality good (which
must be priced lower to attract any consumer), while consumers with the lowest taste
for quality might not purchase at all. A consumer with taste parameter t1 is indi¤erent
between purchasing from rm 1 and not purchasing the di¤erentiated commodity if and
only if t1s1   p1 = 0, so t1 = p1s1 . A consumer with taste parameter t2 is indi¤erent
between the two brands if and only if t2s1   p1 = t2s2   p2, so t2 = p2 p1s2 s1 . Therefore,
the demand functions read
D1 =
1
b  a (t2  max fa; t1g) =
1
b  a

p2   p1
s2   s1  max

a;
p1
s1

D2 =
1
b  a (b  t2) =
1
b  a

b  p2   p1
s2   s1

Each rm i maximizes its prot i = piDi (pi; pj) with respect to pi. We consider two
possible cases in turn: where the market is not covered (i.e. t1 > a) and where the
market is covered (i.e. t1  a).
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Case where the market is not covered. When t1 > a, some consumers with low taste
for quality purchase neither good. Firmsprot maximization yields
p1 =
bs1 (s2   s1)
4s2   s1 and p2 =
2bs2 (s2   s1)
4s2   s1
Then prots read
1 =
b2s1s2 (s2   s1)
(b  a) (4s2   s1)2
and 2 =
4b2s22 (s2   s1)
(b  a) (4s2   s1)2
The condition t1 > a amounts to 0 < s1 < b 4ab a s2 for b  4a.
Case where the market is covered. When t1  a, the market is covered and the
consumer with the lowest taste parameter weakly prefers to purchase product 1. Firms
prot maximization yields
p1 =
1
3
(s2   s1) (b  2a) and p2 = 1
3
(s2   s1) (2b  a) ;
where b > 2a (for both rms compete for consumers). Then prots read
1 =
(b  2a)2 (s2   s1)
9 (b  a) and 2 =
(2b  a)2 (s2   s1)
9 (b  a)
Thus, the high-quality rm charges a higher price than the low-quality producer. It
also makes a higher prot. For the whole market to be covered in equilibrium, the
consumer with taste parameter a should weakly prefer a low-quality good to nothing,
i.e. as1   p1  0, which amounts to b 2aa+b s2  s1 < s2 for b > 2a.
Summing up the results of price competition, if 2a < b < 4a an equilibrium arises
where the entire market is covered. If b  4a the market might be not covered and two
types of equilibria arise: an equilibrium with an uncovered market for 0 < s1 < b 4ab a s2
and an equilibrium with a covered market for b 2aa+b s2  s1 < s2.
In the rst stage, each rm i maximizes i (si; sj) over si. The "marginal relocation
tendency" of rm 2 reads @2@s2  0 for all s1 and b > 2a, therefore rm 2 chooses the
maximal quality level s2 = S. Firm 1s prot maximization yields
s1 =
(
b 2a
a+b S if 2a < b  8a
4
7S if b > 8a:
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Figure 4.1: s

1
S as a function of
b
a > 2.
Figure 4.1 depicts s

1
S as a function of the market size
b
a . Note that for 2 <
b
a  8
the entire market is covered, and the consumer with the lowest taste parameter a is
indi¤erent between buying the low quality product and neither product. The larger the
market, the higher the quality of good 1. The reason is that price competition between
two goods drives their prices down to a level at which not even the consumer with the
lowest taste for quality would want to buy good 1 if its quality is very low. So to attract
consumers, rm 1 has to raise the quality of its good. At some point howeverat ba = 8
exactlyrm 1 prefers to freeze the quality at constant level s1 =
4
7S and not to serve
consumers with low taste parameters such that the market becomes uncovered. Thus,
the discontinuity arises at the point in which the market becomes uncovered.
Denition 10. An equilibrium in the linear vertical market fa; b; Sg with b > 2a is a
list of qualities fs1; s2g, a list of prices fp1; p2g and the percentage of market coverage
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m such that
fs1; s2; p1; p2;mg =
8<:
n
b 2a
a+b S; S;
a(b 2a)
a+b S;
a(2b a)
a+b S; 1
o
if 2a < b  8an
4
7S; S;
1
14Sb;
1
4Sb;
7b
8(b a)
o
if b > 8a:
Dene social welfare, denoted by W , as the gross consumerssurplus:
W =
Z t2
maxfa;t1g
s1t
b  adt+
Z b
t2
s2t
b  adt;
which in the equilibrium reads
W  =
8<:
(5a3 5a2b+2ab2+3b3)
6(b2 a2) S if 2a < b  8a
11b2
24(b a)S if b > 8a:
A social planner would choose the brandsquality to maximize the social welfare, thus
so1 = s
o
2 = S. Hence, in the optimal allocation there are two undi¤erentiated rms that
make no prot, and the social welfare reads
W o =
(a+ b)
2
S:
Consequently, the percentage of welfare losses reads
PWL = 1  W

W o
=
8><>:
( ba 2)(4+ ba)
3( ba 1)(1+ ba)
2 if 2 < ba  8
( ba)
2 12
12( ba 1)( ba+1)
if ba > 8:
(4.1)
Figure 4.2 depicts PWL as a function of ba . Notice that welfare losses are not large, with
a maximum of about 8:33% (which is reached for very large markets, i.e., for ba !1).
The PWL is discontinuous with the market size ba since rm 1s quality is discontinuous
with ba in equilibrium.
We are interested in PWL yielded by this market, conditional on the values taken
by certain variables that can be observed, namely market prices and market coverage.
Formally:
Denition 11. An observation is a list fp1; p2;mg where p1 > 0 is low-quality good
price, p2 > p1 is high-quality good price and m 2 [0; 1] is the percentage of market
coverage.
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Figure 4.2: PWL as a function of ba > 2.
Let us relate PWL with observable variables.
Proposition 3. i) Given an observation fp1; p2;mg where m = 1 and 0 < p1p2  25 , there
is a linear vertical market fa; b; Sg such that
n
S p1p2 p1 ; S; p1; p2;m
o
is an equilibrium for
this market, and
PWL =
p1
p2

6

p1
p2
2   7p1p2 + 2
3

1  p1p2
2 
p1
p2
+ 1
 (4.2)
ii) Given an observation fp1; p2;mg where 78 < m < 1, and p1p2 = 27 , there is a linear
vertical market fa; b; Sg such that 47S; S; p1; p2;m	 is an equilibrium for this market,
and
PWL =

8m
8m 7
2   12
12

8m
8m 7   1

8m
8m 7 + 1
 (4.3)
Proof : First, consider the case where the entire market is covered, m = 1, and
25
0 < p1p2  25 . Let us x S > 0 and let
p1 =
a (b  2a)
a+ b
S, p2 =
a (2b  a)
a+ b
S;
which yields
a =
p2   p1
S
, b =
(2p2   p1) (p2   p1)
(p2   2p1)S
It is straightforward to check that 2 < ba  8 since 0 < p1p2  25 . Then by construction the
market fa; b; Sg yields an equilibrium where fs1; s2; p1; p2;mg =
n
S p1p2 p1 ; S; p1; p2;m
o
.
Plugging a = p2 p1S and b =
(2p2 p1)(p2 p1)
(p2 2p1)S into the rst line of (4.1) we get (4.2) for
PWL as a function of an observation fp1; p2;mg.
Second, consider the case where the market is not covered, 78 < m < 1, and
p1
p2
= 27 .
Fix S > 0, a > 0 and let
p1 =
1
14
Sb, p2 =
1
4
Sb and m =
7b
8 (b  a) ;
which yields
b =
8m
8m  7a:
One can easily check that ba > 8 for
7
8 < m < 1. Then by construction the mar-
ket fa; b; Sg yields an equilibrium where fs1; s2; p1; p2;mg =

4
7S; S; p1; p2;m
	
. Plug-
ging ba =
8m
8m 7 into the second line of (4.1) yields (4.3) for PWL as a function of
observables.
Figure 4.3 depicts PWL as a function of p1p2 for m = 1 and 0 <
p1
p2
 25 . PWL is easily
seen to be single-peaked in the domain
 
0; 25

reaching a maximum at, approximately,
p1
p2
= 0:23. Thus, an increase in relative prices can decrease or increase relative welfare
losses. Figure 4.4 depicts PWL as a function of m for 78 < m < 1 and
p1
p2
= 27 . Here
PWL depends only on the market coverage, in a decreasing way, as expected.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have studied welfare losses in models of horizontal (i.e. location) and
vertical (i.e. quality) di¤erentiation. Here is a summary of our main results.
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Figure 4.3: PWL as a function of p1p2 for m = 1 and 0 <
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1. In location models, despite price competition, welfare losses can be very large,
larger than under monopoly with similar demand but no location choice, the
latter being 25%.16 Except in a single case, welfare losses can be inferred from
observables. Welfare losses are due to lack of market cover and to rms located
in the wrong positions. Markups and demand elasticities do not play any role in
determining welfare losses in these models. They might play a role if consumers
were allowed to buy several goods.
2. Under vertical di¤erentiation welfare losses can be read from prices and market
coverage but they are discontinuous with the size of the market. The percentage
of welfare losses here is not very large. Thus, despite the apparent similarities in
the derivation of equilibrium in models of horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation,
these two models are very di¤erent from the point of view of welfare losses.
The main conclusion of our paper is that the emphasis in empirical studies of
oligopolistic welfare losses and the theory of regulation on prices or outputs might
be a little misguided. Our analysis of horizontal di¤erentiation models suggests that
variables like location or market coverage play a relevant role. In contrast, there is some
work on quality regulation (see Armstrong and Sappington 2005 for an excellent survey
of regulation) but our analysis suggests that welfare losses arising from such an item in
oligopolistic markets might be not very large.
Several extensions of our work are worth mentioning. The models considered in this
paper are symmetric, assume two rms only (except in the case of the Salop model)
and rely on specic forms of the commodity space. We hope that our methods can be
used to study models with asymmetric rms, see e.g. Aghion and Schankerman (2004)
for a Salop model with heterogeneous costs or with other forms of the commodity space
such as the Spokes model, Chen and Riordan (2007). Another possible extension of our
work would be to study consumer and producer surpluses separately and see the e¤ects
of location and market coverage on each variable.
16This follows from Proposition 6 in Anderson and Renault (2003) by setting n =  = 1.
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